Publications

Algaba E., Moretti S., Rémila E., Solal P., Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings, Social Choice and Welfare.

Béal S., Casajus A., Rémila E., Solal P., Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations, Annals of Operations Research.

Cato S., Rémila E., Solal P., Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal, Synthese.

Duchêne E., Gonzales S., Parreau A., Rémila E., Solal P., Influence: a partizan scoring game on graphs, Theoretical Computer Science.

Baeriswyl R., Boun My K., Cornand C., Double overreaction in beauty-contests with information acquisition: theory and experiment, Journal of Monetary Economics.

Béal S., Moyouwou I., Remila E., Solal P., Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value, Mathematical Social Sciences, 104:15-22.

Béal S., Navarro F., Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies, Operations Research Letters, (forthcoming).

Bubboloni D., Diss M., Gori M., Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting, Public Choice, 183: 151-185.

Charness G., Garcia T., Offerman T., Villeval M.C., Do risk preference measures in the laboratory predict behavior under risk in and outside of the laboratory? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (forthcoming).

Corgnet B., Hernan R., Kujal P., On booms that never bust: ambiguity in experimental asset markets with bubbles, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 110, 103754.

Courbage C. and Rey B., On temperance and risk spreading, Theory and Decision, 88: 527-539.

Diss M., Kamwa E., Moyouwou I., Smaoui H., Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention. In M. Diss and V. Merlin, Eds., Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley. Springer, Berlin.

Diss M., Kamwa E., Simulations in models of preference aggregation, OEconomia (forthcoming).

Diss M., Kamwa E., Tlidi, A., On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet principle, Revue d’Economie Politique (forthcoming).

Diss M., Mahajne M., Social acceptability of Condorcet committees, Mathematical Social Sciences, 105: 14-27.

Diss M., Pérez-Asurmendi P., Tlidi A., The effect of closeness on the election of a pairwise majority rule winner. In M. Diss and V. Merlin, Eds., Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley. Springer, Berlin.

Diss M., Merlin V., Evaluating voting systems with probability models, Essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley, Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin.

Garcia T., Massoni S., Villeval M.C., Uncertainty and moral wiggle room in donations, European Economic Review (forthcoming).

Houy N., Nicolai J-P., Villeval M.C., Doing your best when stakes are high? Theory and experimental evidence, Theory and Decision (forthcoming).

Li, Y., Ramoz, N., Derrington, E., Dreher, J.C., Hormonal responses in gambling versus substance abuse: a review of human studies. Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology & Biological Psychiatry, 100: 109880.

Qu, C., Hu, Y., Tang, X., Derrington, E., Dreher, J.-C., Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying immoral decisions benefiting self or others, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 15: 135-149.

Robin, S., Strážnická, K., Villeval, M.C., Bubbles and incentives: an experiment on asset markets, Economic and Political Studies, Special issue on Behavioral and Experimental Economics for Policy Making (forthcoming).

Selin H., Simula L., Income shifting along the intensive vs. the extensive margin: implications for optimal tax design, Journal of Public Economics.

Algaba E., Béal S., Rémila E., Solal P., Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games on voting structures, International Journal of General Systems, 48: 575-602.

Béal S., Rémila E., Solal P., Coalitional desirability and the equal division value, Theory and Decision, 86: 95-106. 

Béal S., Algaba E., Fragnelli V., Llorca N., Sánchez-Soriano J., Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations, Economics Letters.

Bleichrodt H., Courbage C., Rey B., The value of a statistical life under changes in ambiguity, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 58:1-15. 

Bottemanne L., Dreher J.C., Vicarious rewards modulate the drift rate of evidence accumulation from the drift diffusion model, Frontiers in Behavioral Neurosciences (special issue on Social and Non-Social Reward: Neural Mechanisms Implicated in Reward Processing Across Domains and Contexts), 13: 142.

Bouveret S., Blanch R., Baujard A., Durand F., Igersheim H., Lang J., Laruelle A., Laslier J.F., Merlin V., Voter Autrement 2017 for the French Presidential Election - The data of the Online Experiment, Zenodo.

Brent D., Gangadharan L., Mihut A., Villeval M.C., Taxation, redistribution and observability in social dilemmas, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 21: 826-846.

Caldú, X., Ottino, J., Sánchez-Garre, C., Hernan, I., Tor, E., Sender-Palacios, M.J., Dreher J.C., Garolera, M., Jurado, M.A., Effect of the catechol-O-methyltransferase Val 158Met polymorphism on theory of mind in obesity, European Eating Disorder Review.

Gonzalez S., Marciano A., Solal P., The social cost problem, rights and the (non)empty core, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 21: 347-365.

Gonzalez S., Laruelle A., Solal P. Dilemma with approval and disapproval rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 53: 497-517.

Khalvati, K., Park, S.A., Philippe, R., Sestito, M., Dreher, J.C., Rao, P.N., Modeling other minds: Bayesian inference explains human choices in group decision-making, Science Advances, 5(11), eaax8783.

Li, Y., Wang, Z., Boileau, I., Dreher, J.C., Gelskov, S., Genauck, A., Sescousse, G., Altered orbitofrontal sulcogyral patterns in gambling disorder: a multicenter study. Translational Psychiatry, 9 (186).

Mahajne M., Volij O., Condorcet winners and social acceptability, Social Choice and Welfare, 53: 641-653.

Park, S.A., Sestito, M., Boorman, E.D., Dreher, J.C., Neural computations underlying strategic social decision-making in groups, Nature Communications, 10:5287.

Qu E., Météreau E., Butera L., Villeval M.C., Dreher J.C., Neurocomputational mechanisms at play when weighing concerns for extrinsic rewards, moral values, and social image, PLOS Biology 17(6), e3000283.

Saucet C. and Villeval M.C., Motivated Memory in Dictator Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 117: 250-275.

Sorrapera, I., Suvorov, A., van de Ven J., Villeval, M.C., Doing bad to look good: negative consequences of image concerns on pro-social behavior, Revue Economique, numéro spécial Prix Revue Economique, 70: 909-931.

Suchon R. and Villeval M.C., The effects of status mobility and group identity on trust, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 163: 430-463.

Villeval, M.C., Unethical behavior and moral strategies (Comportements non-éthiques et stratégies morales), Revue Economique, numéro spécial Prix Revue Economique 2018, 70: 1021-1046.

Bouveret S., Blanch R., Baujard A., Durand F., Igersheim H., Lang J., Merlin V., Voter autrement 2017 - Online Experiment Zenodo.

Lebon I., Baujard A., Gavrel F., Igersheim H., Laslier JF., Sincere voting, strategic voting: A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems. In L.B. Stephenson, J. Aldrich, and A. Blais, Eds., The Many Faces of Strategic Voting. Tactical Behavior in Electoral Systems Around the World. Chapter 10: 203-232. University of Michigan Press.

Obeso I., Moisa M., Ruff C.C., Dreher J.C., A causal role for right temporo-parietal junction in signaling moral conflict. eLife 2018; 7:e40671

Attanasi G., Rimbaud C., Villeval M.C., Vulnerability and guilt aversion. GREDEG Working Paper 2020-15.

Baujard A., Igersheim H., Lebon I., Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting.

Béal S., Ferrières S., Examination design: an axiomatic approach.

Béal S., Ferrières S., Solal P., The priority value for cooperative games with priority structures.

Bénistant J., Galeotti F., Villeval M.C., The impact of feedback and competitive payment schemes on dishonesty.

Brouwer T., Galeotti F., Villeval M.C., Teaching norms in the street.

Butera L., Grossman P., Houser D., List J.A., Villeval M.C, An economic approach to alleviate the crises of confidence in science: uncertainty and cooperation in the public goods game. NBER 26801

Cooper D., Saral K., Villeval M.C., Why join teams?

Corgnet C., Cornand C., Hanaki, N., Tail events, emotions and risk taking.

Diss M., Kamwa E., Mahajne M., Borda rule is the almost first-order stochastic dominance consensus rule.

Galeotti F., Maggian V., Villeval M.C., Fraud deterrence institutions reduce intrinsic honesty.

Galeotti F., Saucet C., Villeval M.C., Unethical amnesia responds more to instrumental than to purely hedonic motives.

Gonzalez S., Lardon A., Axiomatic foundations of a unifying core.

Li Y., Météreau E., Obeso I., Butera L., Villeval M.C., Dreher J.C., Endogenous testosterone is associated with increased striatal response to audience effects during moral choices.

Loubergé Y., Malevergne Y., Rey B., New results for additive and multiplicative risk apportionment.

Shalvi S., Sorraperra I., van der Weele J., Villeval M.C., Shooting the messenger: demand and supply of ignorance in markets. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2019-071/I.

Simula L., Gini and optimal income taxation by ranks.

Simula L., Bunching and comparative statics properties of optimal income taxation by ranks.

Tergiman C., Villeval M.C., The way people lie in markets. Working paper GATE 2019-27.

Trannoy A., Simula L., The dark side of tax breaks for foreigners.

Trannoy A., Simula L., Gini optimal income taxation.

Courbage C., Peter R., Rey B., Stimulating saving behavior: can a state-dependent interest rate help?